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ABSTRACT 
Lewis proposes a "reconceptualization" (p. 1) of how to link the psychology and neurobiology of 
emotion and cognitive-emotional interactions. His main proposed themes have actually been 
actively and quantitatively developed in the neural modeling literature for over thirty years. This 
commentary summarizes some of these themes and points to areas of particularly active research 
in this area. 
COMMENTARY 
Lewis' stimulating account of data and concepts concerning emotional and cognitive-emotional 
processing claims that "there is simply no overarching framework available to data for 
synchronizing psychological and neural perspectives on emotion" (p. 3), and that "dynamic 
systems ideas ... have never been applied to developing such a framework" (p. 4), before 
proposing that dynamic system modeling can offer "a common language for psychological and 
neurobiological models" (p. 1 ). Lewis frames his proposal after asking "why do the psychology 
and neurobiology of emotion remain largely isolated?" His own proposal is, ironically, an 
example of this isolation, since he has ignored the most developed neural models of emotion and 
cognitive-emotional behavior, which have been building such a framework for over thirty years. 
Lewis provides no quantitative models, but this ignored framework docs. 
All of Lewis' concepts of "nested feedback interactions, global effects of 
neuromodulation, vertical integration, action-monitoring, and synaptic plasticity ... modeled in 
terms of both functional integration and temporal synchronization" (p. 1) are explicated in these 
neural models of emotion and cognitive-emotional interactions, and used to explain and predict 
many behavioral and brain data. When I published my first articles in this area (Grossberg, 1971, 
1972a, 1972b, 1974, 1975, 1978), there were, as Lewis notes, divisions in the field that prevented 
an integration of psychological, neural, and modeling perspectives. The connectionist and 
computational neuroscience revolutions have, however, since occurred and renewed interest in 
behavioral and neural modeling, and models of the type that Lewis espouses have been published 
throughout the mainstream literature (e.g., Brown et al., 1999, 2004; Carpenter and Grossberg, 
1991; Commons et al., 1991; Fiala et al., 1996; Grossberg, 1980, 1982a, 1982b, 1984a, 1984b, 
1987, 1988, 2000a, 2000b; Grossberg and Gutowski, 1987; Grossberg and Levine, 1987, 
Grossberg and Merrill, 1992, 1996; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1987, 1989). My remaining 
comments summarize aspects of the models that develop Lewis's goals. 
The START (Spectrally Timed Adaptive Resonance Theory) model synthesizes three 
models: A CogEM model, an ART model, and a Spectral Timing model. The CogEM model 
describes how cognitive and emotional processes learn through reciprocal interactions to focus 
attention on motivationally desired goals, and to release appropriate actions to realize them. The 
ART model describes how sensory and cognitive representations are learned, focus attention on 
expected events, and drive adaptive memory searches in response to unexpected events. The 
Spectral Timing model describes how learning can release actions at times that are appropriate to 
a given behavioral context. The START model embodies many of the properties that Lewis 
seeks. 
"Positive-feedback and self-amplification" combined with "self,maintaining (negative) 
feedback" (p. 15) are key elements in these nonlinear models. The assertion that "a coherent, 
higher-order form or function causes a particular pattern of coupling among lower-order 
elements, while this pattern simultaneously causes the higher order form" (p. 16) is a key 
hypothesis of ART since its introduction in 1976 (Grossberg, 1976b, 1978, 1980). Indeed, ART 
clarifies how these different levels code complementmy types of information (cf., Grossberg, 
2000a) which, by themselves, are insufficient to control behavior. ART also proposes how 
resonant feedback states can lead to "temporal synchronization ... corresponding to attentional 
states of expectancy or focused perception" (p. 46) (Grossberg, 1976; Grossberg and Somers, 
1991) and how "attentional and evaluative processes ... must remain integrated for some period of 
time for. .. learning to take place" (p. 62). Indeed, this is the main idea of ART: that resonance 
drives learning. ART also introduces a concept of"vigilance" that can explain "vigilant attention 
to strangers" (p. 63) (Carpenter and Grossberg, 1987, 1991). Finally, ART gives mechanizes 
concepts of "intentionality and consciousness" (p. 17) and predicts that "all conscious stales are 
resonant slates". 
Cognitive-emotional resonances of the Co gEM model preceded the introduction of ART 
(Grossberg, 1975) and give mechanistic meaning to Lewis' assertions about "a self-amplifying 
interaction among appraisal and emotion elements" (p. 20) so that "emotions guide the focus of 
attention ... to those features that are emotionally relevant (p. 21). Indeed, Co gEM models how 
attenlional blocking can filter out emotionally irrelevant cues and focus motivated attention upon 
motivationally relevant ones (Grossberg, 1982a, 1982b, 1984b; Grossberg and Levine, 1987; 
Grossberg and Merrill, 1996), clarifying how motivated attention provides a "beam of 
attention ... focused on whatever is emotionally compelling" (p. 36). Lewis cites Damasio's 1999 
book to describe the "affective feeling of emotion" (p. 37). The Damasio model is a heuristic 
version of CogEM (Grossberg, 2000b). As in ART's sensory/cognitive resonances, CogEM 
cognitive/emotional resonances provide the "enduring couplings [that] seem necessary to 
strengthen the connections responsible for learning" (p. 24), notably connections underlying 
conditioned reinforcer and incentive motivational learning (e.g., Grossberg, 2000a, 2000b). 
Orbitofronlal cortex and amygdala (cf., p. 31) are highlighted in CogEM learning processes 
(Grossberg, 2000b), which clarify how "ongoing emotion regulation implies continual 
recruitment of orbitofrontal evaluation by amygdala associations, thus stabilizing the activities of 
both structures" (p. 64) and settling into "a lasting mood-like state" (p. 66). In both ART and 
CogEM, several different types of nonspecific arousal and neuromodulatory functions are 
described that are consistent with Lewis' review. Finally, the claim that "emotion theorists 
restrict their analysis to the effects of clinical trails on emotion and appraisal" (p. 68) is not 
correct. The reverse direction has been used to clarify symptoms of mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia and attention deficit disorder (Grossberg, 1984, 2000). 
These long-standing results contradict Lewis' claim concerning "self-organizing states of 
coherence, there is as yet no mechanism to relate that coherence back to component interactions" 
(p. 52) or that "the mechanism of this meta-integration is unknown" (p. 53). I would argue, 
instead, that convergent psychological and neurobiological data are starting to confirm long-
standing predictions about how these mechanisms work; e.g., Raizada and Grossberg (2003). 
Lewis also discusses how emotional processing may mediate the learning of plans and 
actions, including the role of dopamine (e.g., pp. 55-58), but does not note that action processes 
may obey laws that are complementary to those of perception, cognition, and emotion 
(Grossberg, 2000a). Progress towards quantitatively explaining behavioral and neurobiological 
data about how animals and humans learn actions under the guidance of reinforcing events has 
also been made (e.g., Brown et a!. (1999, 2003); Fiala et a!. (1996)). 
In summary, Lewis provides an excellent introduction to a useful direction for emotion research 
to follow. He regrettably misses the most developed models that realize his stated goals, and thus 
the brain design principles and mechanisms that can turn his goals into working science. I hope 
his article will help readers to better understand such models. 
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